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NOTE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MEDIATION PANELS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent medical malpractice crisis-essentially the great increase in
medical malpractice insurance rates'-has resulted in much legislation aimed
at halting the increase in rates and ensuring that all medical personnel and
facilities can obtain adequate insurance. 2 Although it is arguable that the laws
benefit the entire public (as potential patients) by keeping medical fees
reasonable and ensuring sufficient medical care, 3 it is the relatively small
group of society, comprised of the medical community and their insurers, that
actively seeks lower insurance rates and greater protection against malpractice
claims. 4 It is clearly not in the injured patient's interest to limit or make more
remote the negligent doctor's or hospital's liability. In addition, any prelitiga-
tion mediation system adds to a plaintiffs financial burden in litigating a
malpractice suit.s Therefore, there are competing interests for the legislature
to resolve: the need to keep malpractice insurance rates under control and the
right of every person to have his claims decided fairly and correctly. 6
1. The increase in both the number of malpractice cases and the amounts of jury awards has
caused the increase in insurance rates. Morris, The Rise cf Medical-Liability Suits, in The Best of
Law & Medicine 70/73, at 171 (1974); Comment, Pre-trial Screening of Medical Malpractice
Claims Versus the Illinois Constitution, 10 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 133, 133-34 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as John Marshall]; see ch. 37, § 1(l)(a)-(1)(b), 1975 Wis. Laws 33.
2. See Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified
Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1003, 1077-84 (1977).
3. Most states claim a public policy interest as a justification for this legislation. No. 638, §
15, 1975 Ark. Acts - ("[L]ack of adequate malpractice insurance by physicians and dentists
constitutes an immediate danger to the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state of
Arkansas."); ch. 278, § 1, 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws 953 ("It is the declaration of the legislature that
appropriate measures are required in the public interest to assure that a liability insurance market
be available to physicians and hospitals .... It is, therefore, further declared to be in the public
interest to encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims against physicians and hospitals by
providing for prelitigation screening of such claims by a hearing panel as provided in this act.");
Memoranda of the Executive Department and the Governor of New York, 1975 N.Y. Laws
1599, 1739 (The purpose of the statute is "[t]o deal comprehensively with the critical threat to the
health and welfare of the State by way of diminished delivery of health care services as a result of
the lack of adequate medical malpractice insurance coverage at reasonable rates.'); ch. 37, § 1(k),
1975 Wis. Laws 34.
4. Some legislatures have recognized this special interest purpose. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 58-33-2 (Interim Supp. 1976).
5. If a settlement is not reached at the panel stage, a trial will be conducted as before. The
overall cost is higher since the panel procedure adds time and expense for both plaintiff and
defendant.
6. Since the jury system has historically been the method of determining cases fairly and
correctly, contrary panel decisions would be considered per se unfair and incorrect. See generally
DeVito, Medical-Malpractice Legislation, 1975-76, 176 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 22, 1976, at I, col. 1;
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The attempted remedial legislation has taken many forms,' but an effective
cost reducer is the mediation panel, or, in the alternative, arbitration.8 The
main function of these two systems is ultimately the same: quick disposition of
all medical malpractice claims. Arbitration replaces the trial process and
substitutes a panel of arbitrators to recommend an equitable, binding solu-
tion. On the other hand, medical malpractice mediation panels are used at the
onset of litigation to screen out unmeritorious claims and to encourage
settlement of valid ones, and do not supplant the normal trial process. In the
event that no disposition can be agreed upon, or where there exists some
purely factual dispute, it is hoped that trials can proceed more quickly and
efficiently. 9 As a result of savings in litigation, insurance costs would be
steadied or lowered.
Although court-created and bar-medical association-sponsored mediation
panels have existed in limited form for a number of years,' 0 statutorily-
Note, The New Mexico Medico-Legal Malpractice Panel-An Analysis, 3 N.M.L. Rev. 311
(1973) [hereinafter cited as New Mexico].
7. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 769.42, .45, .53 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (guarantee of minimum
insurance, burden of proof for the standard of care, joint underwriting association); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 58-33-6, -25 (Interim Supp. 1976) (maximum recovery, patient's compensation fund);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214-a (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976) (statute of limitations); N.Y. ins.
Law §§ 681, 682(3), 695 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976) (insurance association, guarantee of
minimum insurance, authorization for participation in federal re-insurance plan); N.Y. Pub.
Health Law § 2805-d (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976) (informed consent definition), Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2307.43 (Page Supp. 1976) (maximum recovery).
8. Report of the Special Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice, State of New York 127
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Special Advisory Panel]. Expressed as a percentage of insurance costs,
the mediation panel was expected to account for nearly half (5%) of a total savings of 12%
produced by the 1975 amendments. Ch. 109, 1975 N.Y. Laws 134. The reason that panels are
expected to achieve such a great savings is the high amount of every insurance dollar that is paid
to attorneys and the relatively small amount that actually compensates injured patients. John
Marshall, supra note 1, at 133 (60% for litigation costs); Note, The Montana Plan for Screening
Medical Malpractice Claims, 36 Mont. L. Rev. 321, 322 (1975) (50% for litigation costs and 25%
for compensation of patients).
9. New Mexico, supra note 6, at 321. See also Bergen, Mediation of Liability Claims, in The
Best of Law and Medicine 70/73, at 177-78 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bergen]. It is a practice of
many insurance companies to settle minor dubious claims for amounts less than what a full trial
might cost, thus saving money in the long run. The Bergen Record, Feb. 17, 1977, at C-I, col. 1.
Insurers, no doubt, hope that panels will cost less and eliminate the need to settle.
10. For a discussion of the well-known Pima County, Arizona, panel and the Southern
California Hospital plan, see J. Waltz & F. Inbau, Medical Jurisprudence 83 (1971); Comment,
Rx for New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 467 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Columbia]. The major defect of these plans was their limited jurisdiction.
Another such plan was the Stevens Panel, upon which the New York statute was modeled. For a
detailed discussion of this plan, see Comment, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the
First Judicial Department of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 Hofstra L. Rev. 261
(1974).
One of the reasons for instituting such a plan was the "conspiracy of silence" which prevented
many plaintiffs from obtaining an expert witness. For example, for many years in New Jersey
there was little chance of a successful suit on account of an "unwritten but absolutely inviolate
agreement among members of the medical profession that they would not appear voluntarily as
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created panels resulted almost exclusively from legislation in 1975 and 1976 as
a response to the malpractice insurance crisis. The statutes vary widely
among the states in both structure and effecliveness. 1' There are, however,
some common, serious constitutional questions--involving the right to trial by
jury, equal protection, and due process-regarding many of these statutes. 12
The object of this Note is to examine each of these constitutional issues in
relation to the mediation panel statutes. After discussing the constitutional
problems, a model malpractice mediation plan within constitutional limits
will be proposed.
II. PANELS AND ARBITRATION SYSTEMS
There are now twenty-seven states with recently established systems for
reviewing potential or actual malpractice claims: twenty-one have prelitiga-
tion mediation panels, 13 three offer arbitration systems, 14 and three have
expert witnesses against a fellow member of the medical profession." Karcher, Malpractice
Claims Against Doctors: New Jersey's Screening Procedure, 53 A.B.A.J. 328, 328 (1967). Other
commentators have cited this as a reason for creation of these panels. See, e.g., Soden, Medical
Malpractice: A Panel, Fed'n Ins. Counsel Q., Winter 199-70, at 13, 14 (plaintiffs won only two
cases in forty years in New Hampshire) [hereinafter cited as Soden]; New Mexico, supra note 6, at
312-13. Although New Jersey in 1959 and New Hampshire in 1971 established their voluntary
panels in order to provide for an expert witness in certain situations, only five states recently
enacting statutes which have created panels have included such provisions. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
12-567(J) (Supp. 1976); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 58.8(5) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 60B (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41A.090
(1975); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-33-23 (Interim Supp. 1976). For a discussion of the conspiracy of
silence, see W. Curran & E. Shapiro, Law, Medicine, and Forensic Science 581-89 (2d ed. 1970).
11. See appendices I-HI. These statutes apply uniform rules to all courts within each state.
The aim is to counter in a coherent fashion what is invariably a statewide problem. The New
Jersey court rule, since it has statewide application, will be discussed in addition to all the
statutes creating voluntary, mandatory, and discretionary panels. Statutes that merely validate
medical services contracts which include arbitration provisions or the use of general arbitration
rules, but do not institute any new procedures, will not be discussed since they do not present the
same constitutional questions.
12. Some commentators have noted the possible con:;titutional issues, but have withheld any
opinion. See, e.g., Columbia, supra note 10, at 506 n.275; Note, The Florida Medical Malprac-
tice Reform Act of 1975, 4 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 50, 70, n.144, 85 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Florida].
13. Alaska Stat. §§ 09.55.535-.536 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567 (Cum, Supp.
1976); Del. Code tit. 18, §§ 6803-6814 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 768.133-.134 (West
Cum. Supp. 1976), noted in Florida, supra note 12, at 76-89; Idaho Code §§ 6-1001 to 1013
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 58.2-.10 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977) (held
unconstitutional), noted in John Marshall, supra note 1, at 133-47; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-9.5-9-1
to 9-10 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1976), noted in Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act:
Legislative Surgery on Patients' Rights, 10 Val. U.L. Rev. 303, 307-12 (1976); Kan. Stat. §§
65-4901 to 4908 (Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.47 (West Cum. Supp. 1977);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 60B (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§
538.010-.080 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-2840 to 2847 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41A.010-.090 (1975); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 519-A:1 to A:10 (1974); N.M.
Sat. Ann. 99 58-33-1 to 33-28 (Interim Supp. 1976); N.Y. Jud. Law § 148-a (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1976); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-19-1 to 19-10 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-3401 to
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hybrid arbitration-panel plans.'s Several states which provide mandatory or
voluntary panels also offer the parties the option of binding arbitration. 16
As mentioned above, arbitration is generally a final, binding method of
resolving a claim. Mediation panels need not provide a final resolution;
however, in many instances, a panel is available subsequent to the rendering
of its decision to aid the parties in reaching a final settlement for damages or
discontinuance. 17 Overall, the panel provides flexibility,' 8 which accounts for
its greater acceptance among those states which provide some alternative to
litigation. ' 9
Certain general characteristics appear in these systems. The majority are
mandatory, either as a prerequisite to the filing of the complaint or as a
requirement prior to trial, but after the action has been commenced in
court. 20 Three states have taken an intermediate position by specifically
providing that panels are to be used only in the discretion of the presiding
judge.2 ' A relatively small number of states have established voluntary
3421 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Va. Code §§ 8-911 to 922 (Cum. Supp. 1976); 'Xis. Stat. Ann. §§
655.02-.21 (,Vest Spec. Pamphlet 1977); ch. 219, §§ 2-11 to 20, 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws 523,
526-30; ch. 434, §§ 40-47, 1976 Neb. Laws 151, 165-70.
The New Jersey system, instituted by court rule, is also a prelitigation panel. N.J. Civ. Prac.
R. 4:21. Since this rule has been in effect for some time and served as a forerunner of the
statutorily created panels, it will also be discussed.
14. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2711.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1977) (held unconstitutional), noted in
Note, Ohio's Rx for the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Patient Pays, 45 U. Cin. L. Rev. 90,
101-02 (1976); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 21-25B-1 to 25B-26 (Supp. 1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
12, §§ 7001-7008 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Since arbitration is an often mentioned alternative to the
panel and has many similar constitutional problems, and because compulsory arbitration for all
small claims has been tried in New York as well as in other states, such systems will also be
discussed and compared.
15. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-2601 to 2612 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.
§§ 3-2A01 to 2A09 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §§ 1301-.301-.309 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977).
16. See appendix I.
17. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.133(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1976); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §
21-25B-21 (Supp. 1977).
18. Most arbitration panels are composed of professional arbitrators, usually attorneys. See
5A Moore's Federal Practice 53.03, at 2921-22 (2d ed. 1975). On the other hand. every
screening panel includes at least one member of the medical profession. See appendix 11. The
purpose of a medical expert on the panel is to provide an intelligent and objective, rather than
sympathetic, opinion on the question of liability.
19. Most states were not inclined to substitute such a system for the trial process in order to
lessen litigation costs, especially since such a procedure is constitutionally suspect as a violation of
the right to trial by jury and due process. See part II(A) & (C) infra.
20. See appendix I. The establishment of mandatory panels may be a reaction to the
decreasing use of voluntary court-created and bar-medical association-sponsored panels. See note
10 supra & note 195 infra and accompanying text.
21. See appendix I. It is apparent that a judge has similar discretion in those states that
require panel hearings after a complaint has been filed. The possibility that a motion to dismiss or
a motion for summary judgment would be granted, and a trial and a pretrial panel thereby
avoided, is sufficient reason to grant judicial discretion over the utilization of panels. Illinois
1977]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
systems. 22 Voluntary arbitration, because of its finality, is more useful than a
voluntary non-binding panel which tends only to waste time and expense
prior to litigation.2 3 Furthermore, if validly agreed upon as an alternative to a
jury trial,2 4 voluntary systems avoid most of the constitutional pitfalls of the
mandatory systems.
25
Most arbitration involves professional arbitrators, usually attorneys. 26 A
typical mediation panel includes a member of the legal profession, 27 at least
one member of the medical profession, 2  and some nonlegal, nonmedical,
noninsurer member, 29 and is intended to provide for a fair, intelligent, and
efficient decision-making body. In essence, the panel can be likened to a
smaller, more sophisticated jury30 or group referee. 31 Although the composi-
tion of the panel presents mostly practical and political, as opposed to
constitutional, questions, 32 it is also relevant to the issue of whether nonjudi-
cial officers may, under state constitutions, perform judicial functions.
The jurisdiction of arbitration and mediation panels varies from state to
state. Some states limit the use of and access to panels to cases involving
physicians and/or hospitals. 33 Others use the ambiguous term "health care
providers."'34 Logically, this term could be defined narrowly, and limited to
direct health care providers such as physicians, nurses, and hospitals, or
defined broadly, and extended to indirect providers such as pharmacists and
requires a certain time lapse after the filing of the complaint, perhaps for the foregoing reason. Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 58.3 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977).
22. See appendix I.
23. See ABA, Interim Report of the Commission on Medical Professional Liability 4-5 (1976).
24. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976), for a
discussion of the questions of duress and adhesion contracts relating to voluntary agreements to
arbitrate.
25. See part III(A) & (C) infra.
26. See note 18 supra.
27. The attorney or judge usually decides motions and often has no vote unless there is a tie
among the other members of the panel. See appendix II.
28. Usually the medical member specializes in the same field as the defendant; when there are
numerous defendants, provision is made for which speci.lty is chosen. E.g., N.Y. Jud. Law §
148-a(3)(b) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976).
29. See appendix II.
30. Juries are generally not considered sophisticated. Florida, supra note 12, at 77; Comment,
Medical Malpractice in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 1214, 1247 (1976); Documentary
Supplement, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice
Claims, 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 693, 710 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Documentary Supplement).
31. Referees or masters are common in the federal court system. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
32. At least one court has found no legal right infringed upon by the absence of a specialist on
the panel. Kletnieks v. Brookhaven Memorial Ass'n, Inc., 53 App. Div. 2d 169, 385 N.Y,S.2d
575 (2d Dep't 1976). See also note 212 infra.
33. E.g., Idaho Code § 6-1001 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 58.2 (Smith-Hurd
Cum. Supp. 1977) (held unconstitutional); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.21(A) (Page Supp. 1977)
(held unconstitutional).
34. See appendix II.
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lab technicians. While definitions provided by the states vary widely,3 5 only a
few include such obvious health care providers as dentists and nurses.
3 6
Arbitrary designations of this nature have led to claims of discrimination from
both excluded and included parties.
37
The operation of medical malpractice panels also varies widely. Only a
slight majority allow the decision of the panel into evidence at a subsequent
trial. 38 With one exception, 39 these states provide that the decision of the
panel is not binding upon the jury; rather, the jury is to ascribe to it whatever
weight it chooses. 40 Some states place an affirmative burden upon the party
losing at the panel stage to reject the panel's findings or be bound by them
after a certain time lapse.4 1 Such provisions affect a party's right to a trial by
jury. There are numerous other operational aspects which do not directly
affect a party's constitutional rights.
42
Clearly, the medical malpractice mediation system has no "typical" plan.
The majority of the states' plans include the following elements: (1) the plans
are panels rather than arbitration systems; (2) the plans are mandatory rather
than voluntary; (3) the decision of the panel is admissible at trial; and (4) the
jurisdiction of the panel is over "health care providers." However, only five of
twenty-seven states have all four of these provisions. 43 These elements raise
35. E.g., the panels in New Mexico, Virginia, and Wisconsin apply to only a few persons.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-33-3(A) (Interim Supp. 1976); Va. Code § 8-91 1(i) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 655.001(8) (West Spec. Pamphlet 1977). Those in Maryland, Missouri, and
Tennessee apply to a larger category of defendants, including nurses and technicians. Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A01(e) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 538.010(2) (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3402(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Other states provide no
definition.
36. See note 35 supra. One justification may be that fewer cases arise with these parties as
defendants.
37. See part Ili(B) infra.
38. See appendix III.
39. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A06(d) (Cur. Supp. 1976). This statute provides
that the decision of the panel is presumptively correct, but not binding. The party against whom
the panel decided has the burden of disproving the decision.
40. E.g., N.Y. Jud. Law § 148-a(8) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976).
41. See appendix III.
42. Most states have some maximum time limitation on the panel's jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Kan. Stat. § 65-4904 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This provision is used to ensure that claims do not last
forever in the panel stage where no resolution may result. Additionally, most states regulate
discovery in order to expedite the panel hearing. E.g., ch. 219, § 2-13, 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws 527
(prohibits all discovery). States also differ on the following questions: (1) whether an expert is
provided either for the benefit of the panel or for a plaintiff successful at the panel stage; (2)
whether a member of the panel may be called to testify at trial; and (3) the nature and basis of the
panel's decision. See appendix III. Regarding the provision of expert witnesses, see note 10supra.
Most states have considered each of these aspects important enough to warrant statutory
specification of the desired approach. Generally, all panels provide for informal hearings with no
strict adherence to the rules of evidence. E.g., Kan. Stat. § 654903 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
43. The states are Indiana, Louisiana (whose statute is nearly identical to Indiana's),
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Tennessee. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to 9-10 (Bums Cum.
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certain constitutional questions which apply to most malpractice screening
systems.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
While most legislatures believe that it is in the best interest of the public to
encourage prelitigation disposition of claims, some plaintiff-patients do not
agree. 44 Challenges to the constitutionality of medical malpractice panels can
be made on several grounds: the right to trial by jury, equal protection, due
process of law, and either the performance of nonjudicial functions by judges
or the performance of judicial functions by nonjudicial personnel. 45
A. Right to Trial by Jury
The seventh amendment, which guarantees the right to trial by jury on the
federal level, has not been made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. 4 6 However, every state except Colorado and Louisiana
47
has provided a jury trial guarantee in civil cases through its state constitution.
The typical provision states that this right shall remain "inviolate" in all cases
where it was guaranteed at common law. 48 Thus, the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action, alleging injury as a result of tortious conduct, has a right
to trial by jury. The two questions presented here are: first, whether any
mandatory panel procedure as a prerequisite to a jury trial is a burden on the
right to trial by jury; and second, whether the admissibility of the panel's
findings and decision into evidence at trial usurps the jury's function. If there
Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.47 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
231, § 60B (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1977); ch. 434, §§ 40-47, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-2840
to 2847 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3401 to -3421 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See
appendices I-III.
44. In states where experts are hard to obtain, such plans should be more acceptable. See
Soden, supra note 10, at 14 (only two successful plaintiffs in forty years in New Hampshire);
Columbia, supra note 10, at 499 (82% of plaintiffs look binding option to obtain expert).
However, the greater availability of experts today has lessened the attractiveness of these plans
and even New Jersey's plan is not now working. Columbia, supra note 10, at 495 n.189.
45. Courts in only four states have specifically ruled upon the constitutionality of a
mandatory panel or arbitration system-Florida, Illinois. New York, and Ohio. These states are
evenly split on the question. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977) (constitutional); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 II. 2d 313, 347
N.E.2d 736 (1976) (unconstitutional); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.YS.2d 122
(2d Dep't 1976) (constitutional); Halper v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct.
1976) (constitutional); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d
903 (Ct. C.P. 1976) (unconstitutional). Only in Illinois are panel findings inadmissible at a
subsequent trial. See appendix III.
46. 1 C. Antieau, Modem Constitutional Law § 7:17, at 549 (1969).
47. Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients' Rights, 10
Val. U.L. Rev. 303, 326 n.134 (1976). See also Birbaurn, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of
Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1003, 1079
n.510 (1977). The discussion in part 1II(A), dealing with the violation of the right to trial by jury,
would not be applicable to the Louisiana panel.
48. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. 1, § 22; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2; Ohio Const. art. 1, § 5.
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is a burden on plaintiff's constitutional right, possible justifications must be
considered.
1. Prerequisite of a Panel
The initial challenge to the constitutionality of the panels concerns the
burden placed on an individual's right to a jury trial by mandatory com-
pliance with any panel procedure prior to trial.4 9 No state substitutes entirely
the panel procedure for a trial, as is common in workmen's compensation and
no-fault statutes.50 However, although the right to trial by jury is preserved,
the parties must comply with certain procedural requirements before they
may exercise that right. Such a precondition might appear unconstitutional.
The Florida Supreme Court has rejected such a conclusion. In Carter v.
Sparkman," that court reversed a trial court holding that Florida's statute
violated the right to "timely access to the courts ' - 2 guaranteed by the state
constitution. The lower court had reasoned that any mandatory prerequisite
to trial by jury burdened that right.5 3 The supreme court majority, however,
held that this pretrial requirement of mandatory compliance with the mal-
practice panel procedure, though at the "outer limits of constitutional toler-
ance," was not a burden and was constitutional.5 4 The concurring opinion
likened the mediation panel to a pretrial settlement conference which, though
possibly harsh to some parties, was not unreasonable."
At least one court has accepted the theory that a mandatory prerequisite to
trial by jury can be an impermissible burden upon that right. The Illinois
Supreme Court in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association-6 affirmed
the trial court's declaratory judgment that the Illinois statute requiring a
hearing by a malpractice panel prior to trial was unconstitutional. The
supreme court based its decision, however, on the invalidity of the form of
49. Voluntary systems do not involve the same constitutional question. In addition, voluntary
binding panel or arbitration plans often provide that the plaintiff be made aware that he has
given up his jury trial right. See, e.g., S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 21-25B-3 (Supp. 1977)_
SO. Workmen's compensation statutes provide for employer liability as a quid pro quo for
exclusivity of remedy. 2A A. Larson, Vorkmen's Compensation Law § 65.10, at 12-4 (1976).
Such a procedure has been held constitutional. Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (Sth Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972). No-fault statutes provide a similar quid pro quo of
immediate, unquestioned payment of all costs regardless of fault. It should be noted that, as with
the malpractice panel, Illinois has found the no-fault concept unconstitutional. Grace v. Howlett,
51 Ill. 2d 478, 282 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
51. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977), ret,'g 43 Fla. Supp. 107
(Cir. Ct. 1975). Another circuit court had found the statute unconstitutional. Solomon v.
Memorial Hosp., 43 Fla. Supp. 105, 107 (Cir. Ct. 1975). Apparently, this case was not appealed.
52. Solomon v. Memorial Hosp., 43 Fla. Supp. 105, 107 (Cir. Ct. 1975). This presents the
same issue as the infringement of the right to trial by jury resulting from a mandatory prerequisite
to a jury trial.
53. Sparkman v. Carter, 43 Fla. Supp. at 109.
54. 335 So. 2d at 806.
55. Id. at 807 (England, J., concurring).
56. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
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that state's pretrial procedure, and concluded: "Because we have held that
these statutes providing for medical review panels are unconstitutional, it
follows that the procedure prescribed therein as the prerequisite to jury trial is
an impermissible restriction on the right of trial by jury . . . ., The pretrial
procedure at issue involved a malpractice panel composed of a judge, an
attorney, and a physician. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the judge
was not devoting full time to his judicial duties and that nonjudicial members
of the panel were performing a judicial function.5" The composition of the
panel was, therefore, unconstitutional, and as a result any decision-making by
such a panel was held an unconstitutional procedure that necessarily im-
properly burdened an individual's right to trial by jury. The court, however,
limited its holding to situations where a panel's composition was constitu-
tionally defective: "[W]e do not imply that a valid pretrial panel procedure
cannot be devised. '59 Accordingly, the Wright decision cannot be construed
as precedent for finding a mandatory prerequisite to a jury trial an impermis-
sible burden on that right.
There is further support for the validity of mandatory pretrial panels. The
right to a trial by jury obviously does not guarantee a jury trial on every set of
facts. 60 In addition to jury trials, masters and special referees are often used
to hear certain issues and to render findings of fact and conclusions of law. 6 1
This precondition to a jury trial is not an unconstitutional burden on the right
to trial by jury. 62 Indeed, the reference of a particular matter to a master is as
much a part of the litigation procedure as a pretrial conference. 63
Analogous to the medical malpractice mediation system are workmen's
compensation and no-fault insurance plans. Each substitutes a new procedure
for a trial by jury; nevertheless, each system has been found to be constitu-
tional. 64 Initially, only voluntary workmen's compensation plans were held
constitutional. 65 Subsequently, even compulsory workmen's compensation
plans were held constitutional based upon the implied consent of the parties. 66
57. Id. at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741 (emphasis added).
58. See notes 168-75, 181-82 infra and accompanying text.
59. 63 Ill. 2d at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
60. Indeed, if a jury trial were necessary in every case, motions to dismiss or motions for
summary judgment would rarely, if ever, be granted.
61. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
62. Irving Trust Co. v. Trust Co., 75 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1935). See also 5A Moore's
Federal Practice 53.14[3], at 3037-38 (2d ed. 1975).
63. One judge has likened the medical malpractice panel procedure to a pretrial conference.
Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977).
64. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 388 (1917) (workmen's compensation);
Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975) (no-fault).
Contra, Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 282 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (no-fault). See generally, I A.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 5.20 (1972); Hart. The Constitutionality of the New
York State Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 379
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
65. See Comment, No-Fault Insurance in Kentucky--A Constitutional Analysis, 62 Ky. L.J.
590, 593 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kentucky].
66. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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One commentator has suggested that the implied consent theory can be used
to justify mandatory no-fault statutes. 67 Thus, in the case of automobile
accidents, the reasoning- is that one impliedly consents to the provisions of a
state's no-fault statute by driving on its roads. The application of similar logic
to the medical malpractice liability situation, however, has little merit, since a
person who is ill must submit to a doctor's care.
Although compulsory workmen's compensation and no-fault plans com-
pletely eliminate any jury trial in applicable circumstances, they do not
impermissibly burden an individual's right to trial by jury.68 Therefore, the
prerequisite of a panel-a nonbinding proceeding-should not burden that
right. While the analogy is compelling, it must be remembered that counter-
vailing sacrifices are made by each party in workmen's compensation (strict
employer liability for exclusivity of the workman's remedy) and no-fault
(immediate and certain compensation for both parties without regard to fault)
cases which justify the disregard of the right to trial by jury. There appears to
be no compensating sacrifice on the part of the medical profession to offset a
burden on a patient's constitutional rights. It is unlikely, then, that the
comparison with workmen's compensation and no-fault cases alone would
justify the view that the prerequisite of a panel is not a burden on an
individual's right to trial by jury. However, if considered in conjunction with
the argument that panels do not replace the trial process, but merely postpone
it, and if the panel meets all other constitutional tests, 69 the fact that a
mandatory prerequisite to a jury trial exists should not of itself unconstitu-
tionally burden the right to trial by jury.
2. Admissibility of Decision as Evidence
The panel's decision is, in some states, admissible into evidence at trial, 7 0 if
there is no resolution as a result of the panel's consideration of the claim.
Although the statutes also provide that the decision of the panel is not
binding, 7' it is questionable whether the jury will find adversely to the panel's
decision. While the effect of a divided panel's opinion may be minimal, a
unanimous decision may be considered controlling by the jury. In addition,
the decision of one member of the panel-such as a judge or physician-may
be given greater weight.7 2 In these circumstances, the adverse effect on the
67. Kentucky, supra note 65, at 595, 60O1.
68. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
69. The procedure must also pass the tests of equal protection and due process, and not
infringe upon any constitutional provisions requiring judges to devote full time to their judicial
duties or prohibiting nonjudicial members from performing judicial functions. See part [l(B)-(D)
infra for a detailed discussion of these issues.
70. See appendix III. Some states limit the admissibility of decisions to unanimous ones, or to
findings of liability and fact. However, this discussion has no applicability to states which do not
provide for the admissibility of a panel's findings or decision into evidence at a trial. In those
states the right to a jury trial will be an issue only if the panel is a mandatory prerequisite to trial.
See part III(A)(1) supra.
71. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
72. For example, the jury may perceive the physician's opinion as more reasonable since he
has more expertise in the area.
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jury may result in a burden on the parties' right to trial by impartial jury.7 3
An Ohio trial court accepted this rationale and held that state's compulsory
medical malpractice mediation system unconstitutional in Simon v. St.
Elizabeth Medical Center.74 In the words of the court, the procedure, which
permitted introduction of the panel's findings into evidence at a subsequent
trial, "effectively and substantially reduces a party's ability to prove his case,
because that party must persuade a jury that the decision of the arbitrators
was incorrect, a task not easily accomplished in view of the added weight
which juries have traditionally accorded the testimony of experts." 75 The
court further stated that "strings" on the right to trial by jury made it a "far
less effective right" and that the testimony of the arbitrators would be
"prejudicial. '76 The admissibility into evidence of the panel's findings was,
therefore, the cornerstone of the Ohio court's dissatisfaction with the mal-
practice panel system. In this regard, the Ohio court did state, however, that
a compulsory arbitration rule established by another Ohio state court was
constitutional since the decision of the arbitrators was inadmissible at trial. 7
The Simon court did not object to the mandatory nature of the system, but to
the admissibility of the panel's decision into evidence as a burden on the right
to trial by jury.
Another objection to the admissibility of a panel's findings is that such
evidence violates the "ultimate fact in issue" limitation on expert testimony. 78
Under this rule, while an expert is allowed to give his opinion regarding the
applicable standard of care, he is not allowed to express his opinion as to
liability, the ultimate question reserved for the jury. On the other hand, the
expert's conclusion as to liability is usually apparent from his testimony
regarding the standard of care.79 For this reason, the Federal Rules of
73. It has been suggested that in view of the weight juries have traditionally given to expert
testimony, it is more than likely that an unfair decision of the panel will be carried over Into a
jury verdict. See, e.g., Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, S0
Tul. L. Rev. 655, 681 (1976) ("[T]he prejudicial effect of an admissible, adverse panel report
could be virtually impossible to overcome, thus carrying over an unjust panel determination into
a judgment."); Note, Ohio's Rxfor the Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Patient Pays, 45 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 90, 102 (1976) ("jury may give undue weight to ... findings'). For a discussion of
whether juries have concurred with the panel's findings, see Documentary Supplement, supra
note 30, at 720; New Mexico, supra note 6, at 323.
74. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. 1976). This case also held certain pleading
requirements and maximum recovery limits unconstitutional. It should be noted that the Ohio
system is labeled as arbitration; however, arbitration and panel systems present the same
constitutional issue of violation of the right to trial by jury.
75. Id. at 168, 355 N.E.2d at 908.
76. Id. Several commentators have asserted that the admission of the panel's findings into
evidence may be nearly impossible to overcome. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
77. 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 169, 355 N.E.2d at 908-09.
78. The Simon court relied in part on this theory. Id. at 169, 355 N.E.2d at 908 (citing
Trebotich v. Broglio, 33 Ohio St. 2d 57, 294 N.E.2d 669 (1973)). The "ultimate fact in issue"
rule is not, of itself, an objection of constitutional dimensions. It is derived, however, from the
right to trial by jury and the necessity not to infringe upon that right.
79. Most states provide that the majority opinion, dissenting opinion, and the vote count are
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Evidence ° and some state courtss I have abolished the "ultimate fact in issue"
rule. The notion that permitting this testimony would "usurp the power of the
jury" has been considered "empty rhetoric.18 2 It has been recognized that
expert opinion is an aid to the jury, not an alternative to it. 83 Such considera-
tions apply with equal force to the expert opinion of the medical malpractice
panels. Of course, the opinion of a panel may have more weight than that of a
single expert; nevertheless, the jury should still have the benefit of this
information.
The view that the opinion of a medical malpractice mediation panel is
merely some evidence and an aid to the jury has been accepted by at least two
courts. In Comiskey v. Arlen,8 4 after a New York trial court found that the
admissibility of the panel's findings into evidence would " 'nullify plaintiff's
constitutional right to a meaningful jury trial' " since it was "unrealistic" to
believe that the jury would do more than adopt the panel's findings, 85 the
appellate court reversed, basing its decision on the historical independence of
jurors.8 6 This paralleled the reasoning of the only other New York case to
have considered the issue, Halpern v. Gozan,87 which, in praising the jury
system, also cited the historical independence of jurors.8 8 The Halpern court
overruled an objection by the defendant to the introduction of the
panel's unanimous decision into evidence and opined that if the judge
properly instructs the jury regarding the panel's findings, a jury may find
differently. 89 Since the panel's findings were not binding, and were given only
"such weight as the jury . . .[chose] to ascribe to [theml," 90 there was found
to be no unconstitutional infringement on the right to trial by jury.
admissible and may be commented upon by counsel. See appendix IH. Calling a panel member as
a witness can help to ameliorate the impact of admissibility if the panelist's reasoning can be
brought into question. See note 91 infra. However, few states permit a panelist to testify at trial
See appendix IlL
80. Fed. R. Evid. 704.
81. E.g., People v. Wilson, 25 Cal. 2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944); Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co
v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 I1. 2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960); Dowling v. L.H. Shattuck, Inc., 91
N.H. 234, 17 A.2d 529 (1941); Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454. 230 P.2d 195 (1951); Cal.
Evid. Code § 805; Kan. Civ. Pro. Stat. § 60-456(d); N.J. Evid. R_ 56(3)
82. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1920, at 17 (3d ed. 1940).
83. 11 Moore's Federal Practice § 704.10. at VII-66 (2d ed. 1975) ("Wisely, it seems to us.
Rule 704 adopts a rational approach, which permits opinion testimony on ultimate issues, when
helpful. This testimony will aid the trier, but not supplant nor invade his province, since it is the
trier of fact who ultimately determines what weight to give the opinion testimony of the
witness.").
84. 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1976).
85. Id. at 306, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
86. Id. at 307, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
87. 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
88. Id. at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49.
89. Id. at 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
90. N.Y. Jud. Law § 148-a(8) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976). Every state that provides for the
admissibility of the panel's decision uses the same formula with the exception of Maryland, where
a panel finding is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the losing party to disprove it. Md
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Despite the reliance of the two New York cases on the jury's independence,
one may indeed wonder whether a jury of laymen faced with a complex
medical malpractice problem will find adversely to an expert panel's decision.
A jury may be so overwhelmed by the panel's findings that the right to trial
by jury-the right to an independent jury decision-will be severely eroded.
Both proper and improper panel decisions may simply be carried over into a
jury verdict. Nevertheless, although one party may stress the panel's decision,
the other party is free to contradict the panel's findings and, in some states,
question the panelists at the trial. 9' In addition, the party offering the panel's
decision into evidence must still prove that it was correct. 92 Such is the
procedure in federal and state courts when masters and special referees are
used. 93 Thus, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitution-
ality of Federal Rule 53 which permits the use of masters even in jury cases. 94
The basis of the Court's decision has been interpreted as the ability of "the
jury [to] accept or reject the master's findings as it sees fit . . . ."9 Since the
statutes providing for malpractice screening panels use similar language, the
admissibility of the panel's decision into evidence at trial should not, by
analogy, impermissibly burden the right to trial by jury. Moreover, in most
states panel decisions alone do not satisfy the burden of proof, as compared to
a master's decision, which, if uncontradicted at trial, may be sufficient. 96
Similarly, the introduction into evidence of the panel's decision should also
not be considered a usurpation of the jury's function. The jury still makes
the final determination and must be satisfied by the proof offered at trial.
3. Possible Justifications
Although a compelling argument may be made that there is no burden on
the constitutional right to trial by jury under either of the above theories,
courts may yet find such a burden. In these circumstances, justifications for a
burden on the right to trial by jury must be considered. 97 Two principal
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A06(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976). This presents an entirely different
situation from the one considered by the New York and Ohio courts, and the constitutionality of
such a rule is gravely suspect.
91. E.g., N.Y. Jud. Law § 148-a(8) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976). A recent New York
Supreme Court case has found this provision sufficient to justify the admissibility of the panel's
decision without explanation or reasoning. Panelists called at trial could explain the decision.
Abrams v. Brooklyn Hosp., - Misc. 2d -, -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
92. The panel's decision is only part of the evidence comprising the entire proof. Only in
Maryland would this alone be sufficient to sustain a verdict. See note 90supra and accompanying
text. The usual provision that no presumption is drawn from the panel's decision is similar to that
concerning masters in the Federal Rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3).
93. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e); Fla. Civ. Proc. R. 1.40(g). Contra, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
644. See also 5A Moore's Federal Practice 53.12[1l, at 2998 (2d ed. 1975).
94. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
95. 5A Moore's Federal Practice 53.14[3], at 3037 (2d ed. 1975).
96. Id. 53.14[4], at 3040.
97. The justification, of course, must be in response to a compelling state interest since a
constitutional right is involved. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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theories can be offered to warrant burdening this right: the need for an expert
and public policy.
Some attempt must be made to limit the steady increase in medical
malpractice insurance rates and the resulting higher cost of medical care. A
number of state legislatures have therefore relied on a public policy
rationale--controlling the increase in malpractice insurance rates and medical
costs--to support malpractice panels. 9 This justification was, however,
rejected by the Ohio court in Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center.99 The
court took note of the insurance crisis, but concluded that "in this Court's
opinion, there is no crisis situation, short of civil insurrection, sufficient to
deprive, water down or make less valuable the right to seek redress of
grievances . . . through the medium of a free and unfettered jury trial."' 00
Similarly, one commentator has espoused the public policy favoring jury trials
as the basic reason for not replacing that system: "Clearly, the adoption of
[malpractice panel] procedures is inconsistent with the spirit as well as the
fundamental precepts of the traditional trial process; a process that has, in the
overall, served us well."'' Such uncompromising adherence to the inviolate
nature of the right to trial by jury does not allow for any infringement and
characterizes the mediation panels as per se infringements susceptible of no
policy justification. On the other hand, concern with the insurance crisis was
sufficient to justify any possible constitutional burden imposed by automobile
no-fault insurance plans. 102 However, any court viewing the right to trial by
jury as strictly as the Simon court would accept no justification for burdening
that right. Given these circumstances, it is questionable whether the public
policy in favor of a reduction in insurance costs through a pretrial panel
procedure would be sufficiently compelling to override the perceived infringe-
ment of a constitutionally-guaranteed jury trial right.
The other possible justification is the need for expert opinion in most
medical malpractice actions and the historic difficulties in obtaining such an
expert. 0 3 In other types of cases, masters or referees are used and their
98. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
99. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. 1976). The Ohio court, which was the only
court to cite other cases dealing with the constitutional issues relevant to malpractice panel
statutes, rejected both Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (1977), and Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976), as
relying solely upon public policy. 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 171, 355 N.E.2d at 910-11. The Florida and
New York cases had relied to some extent, but not exclusively, upon public policy. See 335 So.
2d at 805; 85 Misc. 2d at 755-56, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
100. 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 172, 355 N.E.2d at 911-12.
101. DeVito, Medical Malpractice Legislation, 1975-76, 176 N.Y.L.J.. Dec. 22, 1976, at 3,
col. 2.
102. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1(1975). Indeed,
one of the New York courts upholding the constitutionality of that state's malpractice panel
statute cited Montgomery extensively and recognized that the insurance crisis caused by automo-
bile accident cases, which led to no-fault statutes, was a reasonable legislative response. Halpern
v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 757-58, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 74748 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
103. See note 10 supra.
19771
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
findings are admissible in evidence, but the final decision is left to the jury. 104
The need for a master is based upon the complexity of the action.10 5 Since
malpractice actions can be both complex and highly technical, the use of a
master-type panel in malpractice actions is clearly justifiable. The jury would
have the benefit of the panel's expert opinion to aid them in their resolution of
what are generally difficult factual issues.106 One possible safeguard of the
independence of the jury's opinion would be to admit the expert's opinion
"subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections . . . ,,,t10 as is the
procedure when masters are used in federal court. Such a procedure would go
far in ensuring an independent jury decision, since prejudicial, irrelevant, and
unsupported findings would be kept from the jury. However, this safeguard
has been adopted, in the malpractice panel area, by only two states.' 0 8
Nevertheless, the same justification that supports the use of masters is equally
applicable to the use of mediation panels in medical malpractice actions, and
the need for expert opinion may be sufficiently compelling to override any
claim that a party's constitutionally-guaranteed right to trial by jury is
threatened.
4. Summary
It is submitted that the use of medical malpractice panels as a prerequisite
to a trial by jury is not an impermissible burden on a party's constitutional
right. The right remains intact; only its fulfillment is postponed. Admitting a
panel's findings and decision into evidence at trial, though it might appear to
usurp the jury's function, does not burden the right to trial by jury because
the ultimate decision is always left to the jury. The panel's decision is merely
an aid to which the jury may give whatever weight it chooses. Nevertheless,
where state courts find that there is a burden on the right to trial by jury, the
burden may still be justified either by public policy considerations, such as the
reduction of litigation and insurance costs, or by the need for an expert
opinion. Since, however, such justifications may not be sufficiently compelling
to justify a burden on a constitutional right, it appears that whether malprac-
tice panels will be upheld will depend upon an initial finding that there
is not a burden upon the right to trial by jury.
B. Equal Protection
1. Introduction
The question of whether a party has been discriminated against can be
examined in three different ways: (1) are parties to all medical malpractice
104. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 53; see Note, Medical Malpractice Litigation: Some Suggested
Improvements and a Possible Alternative, 18 U. Fla. L. Rev. 623, 633 (1966). The Federal Rule
has been held constitutional in jury cases. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
105. 5A Moore's Federal Practice 53.0512], at 29,16-47 (2d ed. 1975).
106. The purpose of a master's report is that of an "expert witness" on the matter. Id.
53.14[4], at 3039.
107. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3).




suits treated alike; (2) are all parties to a medical malpractice suit treated
alike; (3) are all parties to all malpractice or tort suits treated alike? The
extent of the jurisdiction granted by each statute, that is, to which actions the
panel applies, will determine which question is appropriate. 0 9
If a court should find, in answer to any of the above questions, that a party
is being treated unequally as a result of state action, it must then consider
justifications for this discrimination in order to determine whether or not there
has been a denial of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection."' The
mere existence of discrimination does not automatically violate equal protec-
tion.'11 Two tests are used to determine whether discrimination results in a
denial of equal protection. If a fundamental right" 12 or a suspect classifica-
tion' 3 is involved, there must exist a compelling state interest to justify the
discrimination." 4 However, the compelling interest doctrine is inapplicable
here since neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved. The
second test, which demands only a rational basis to permit discrimination, is
therefore applicable." 15
2. Analysis
The jurisdiction of the mediation panels varies greatly from state to state.
While some are limited to physicians or to physicians and hospitals, others
apply to all "health care providers" or all medical malpractice claims. I 6 The
result in most states is that only in some medical malpractice claims is a panel
required or permitted, while in other perhaps equally complex and important
cases, they are not. Furthermore, in states with limited panel jurisdiction it is
possible, in a given case, that some defendants will be subject to a panel while
others are not. The denial of a panel in one case involving one defendant and
the requirement of a panel in a second case involving another defendant has
the effect of placing similarly situated parties in unequal positions. "17 In order
109. See appendix II.
110. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
112. The term "fundamental right" encompasses most of the specific guarantees of the first
eight amendments of the Constitution. See Cord, Neo-Incorporation: The Burger Court and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 215, 224-26 (1975). It is
broader than this, however, since it also includes liberties "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. lassachusetts, 291 U.S. 97. 105
(1934)); accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Such liberties
would include, inter alia, the right of privacy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). and the
right to travel, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
113. To date, only classifications based on race, alienage, national origin, or illegitimacy have
been found inherently suspect. See Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-32 (1974); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
114. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
115. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); see note 119 infra.
116. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
117. A typical approach to discrimination cases generally asks whether or not similarly
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to be nondiscriminatory, the same procedure must be applicable to the
parties to all medical malpractice actions. States that limit the jurisdiction of
the panels to less than all of the parties, such as only to physicians and
hospitals, would be discriminating against all other parties to medical mal-
practice actions.
Though no court has considered this formulation of the question of dis-
crimination, it has been considered in the analogous situation provided by
workmen's compensation statutes which typically exclude farm workers from
their coverage. 1 8 Such a distinction has been found to be both rational and
permissible.' 19 Likewise, although no-fault insurance laws may not apply, for
example, to motorcyclists, 2 0 such classifications are usually upheld as reason-
able.' 2' Accordingly, it may be argued that medical malpractice mediation
statutes which establish jurisdiction only over physicians and hospitals make
reasonable classifications intended to remedy the most costly problems in the
medical malpractice area. Certain members of the medical profession are
more often involved in expensive litigation. Thus, it would be reasonable to
require panels in actions involving physicians and hospitals, but not dentists
and nurses. On the other hand, a distinction between types of physicians or
between physicians and hospitals may be too arbitrary to be rational. Most
malpractice panel statutes would, it appears, satisfy the rational basis test and
would not be violative of equal protection.
The second question directed to the equal protection issue centers on the
specific action before the court and the parties to that action. In some states,
where panels are prerequisites to litigation, 2 the plaintiff must allege com-
pliance in his complaint. However, in certain circumstances defendants can
successfully avoid a hearing before the panel.' 2 3 Thus, while panels are
mandatory for plaintiffs, they are optional for defendants, seemingly, a
discrimination against the plaintiffs in the particular action.
Such an argument was accepted by the Florida Supreme Court in Carter v.
situated parties are treated in the same manner. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367-68
(1886). The initial question therefore is whether plaintiffs who are claiming discrimination are
similarly situated with other persons who are treated differently. If not, there can be no
discrimination. B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law § 153, at 286-87 (1972). For the purposes of this
Note, it is assumed that parties to a medical malpractice action, be they patients, doctors,
hospitals, or even X-ray technicians, are in fact similarly situated by virtue of their involvement
in the action.
118. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 3306(c)(1), (k) (1970); N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 2(4) (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1976).
119. Romero v. Hodgson, 319 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam), aft'd, 403
U.S. 901 (1971). Contra, Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., 388 Mich. 654, 658, 202 N.W.2d 786,
791 (1972). See also 20 Wayne L. Rev. 179 (1973).
120. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-2(a) (West 19731.
121. Hart, supra note 64, at 397-98.
122. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.133(1)(a) (We!.t Cum. Supp. 1976).
123. Defendant's failure to respond terminates the panel's jurisdiction in some cases. E.g.,
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.133(1)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 19741).
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Sparkman.124 The defendant-appellant in that case argued that all plaintiffs
in medical malpractice actions were treated alike 25 and that regulation of this
specific class was permissible. 26 The plaintiff, however, argued that the
panels were discriminatory because, while mandatory for all plaintiffs, defen-
dants could cooperate or not as they wished.' 2 7 The Florida Supreme Court
accepted the plaintiffs formulation of the appropriate test:128 whether all
parties to the particular action are treated alike. Nevertheless, although the
statute appeared to be mandatory only for the plaintiffs, a result which would
have been discriminatory, the court construed the statute so as to effectively
force the defendant to comply with the panel procedure or have the fact of his
noncompliance (with the possible accompanying inference of liability) admis-
sible into evidence at trial.' 2 9 As long as the panel was effectively mandatory
for both parties, the court found no discrimination and therefore no denial of
equal protection.
Here the question of distinguishing between medical defendants in separate
actions does not arise as only one particular action is involved. Only the
imposition of different requirements upon plaintiff and defendant would be
discriminatory. 130 If a state requires a panel, it should be mandatory for both
plaintiff and defendant. ' 3' As the court in Carter v. Sparkman 32 found, there
appears to be no rational justification for permitting different treatment of
parties to the same action. Because the medical malpractice insurance crisis
resulted in increases in both medical malpractice insurance rates and the cost
of medical care, it affects medical defendants and patient-plaintiffs equally.
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to allow one a choice of compliance
while the other is bound by law to comply. Any discrimination on this basis
would thus be unreasonable and have no justification, and would result in a
denial of equal protection.
Finally, almost every state employs panels for the sole purpose of screening
124. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
125. Brief for Appellee, Sparkman v. Carter, 43 Fla. Supp. 107, 121 (Cir. Ct. 1975).
126. Id. at 120.
127. Brief for Appellant, id. at 113-14. Plaintiff argued that this would cause unnecessary
delay and expense.
128. 335 So. 2d at 805.
129. Id. In the Fourth Department of the Appellate Division in New York, failure to appear
can result in default. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1028.5(c) (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975). Failure of a party to
answer may result in dismissal of the action or judgment against him, a stronger remedy than
that provided for by statute. Compare id. § 1024.7(b) with N.Y. Jud. Law § 148-a(S) (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1976).
130. Plaintiffs can circumvent panels in New York by filing a complaint in district or county
court instead of supreme court. Ernst v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 86 MIsc. 2d 694, 382 N.Y.S.2d
915 (Dist. Ct. 1976). This, however, is an exceptional situation.
131. The same reasoning should also apply to voluntary panels, where one party is offered the
choice of using a panel or not.
132. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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medical malpractice claims,' 33 a procedure generally not followed for other
tort actions or other professional liability cases. This raises the question of
whether parties to medical malpractice actions are discriminated against by a
requirement which entails additional burdens of time and expense, beyond
those required in similar nonmedical suits. It has been argued in an analo-
gous situation that no-fault insurance plans create a difference between
automobile accident and other tort cases. Such a difference has been consid-
ered permissible and, since it is reasonably related to the legislative purpose of
remedying the specific problems of automobile accident cases, not violative of
equal protection. 
34
The Ohio court in Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center 13s rejected this
rationale and found its statute unconstitutional. The court concluded that
benefits, such as a pretrial panel hearing, which were not available to
defendants in other tort cases, had been conferred on the medical malpractice
defendants. 36 The court apparently found the appropriate class by which to
judge discrimination to be the class of all parties to all tort actions. 13 7
However, acceptance of this rationale, comparing medical malpractice actions
to all other tort actions, absolutely prohibits different procedures for different
tort actions, an impractical and unworkable situation. Common variations in
tort actions, such as the requirement of specific interrogatories in all motor
vehicle accident cases and pleading and proving special damages in certain
libel cases, would be discriminatory. On the other hand, it would seem that
special provisions for certain tort actions and, in particular, for medical
malpractice actions, would not be discriminatory simply because they are
reasonable classifications. 1
38
The characterization of medical malpractice actions as a separate class
appears reasonable because of the severity of both the medical malpractice
insurance crisis and the consequent decrease in adequate medical care. Thus,
a Federal District Court of Tennessee has decided that, based upon the
Tennessee legislature's finding of a need for a malpractice panel, there was a
rational justification for the use of panel procedures only in medical malprac-
tice actions. 1 39 That state's mandated compliance with the terms of its
mediation statute as a condition to the filing of a complaint was held to be "a
133. New Hampshire's panel requirement also applies to attorneys. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
519-A:2 (1974).
134. Hart, supra note 64, at 394-95.
135. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. 1976).
136. Id. at 167, 355 N.E.2d at 906. The reverse argument could also be used: since an
adverse finding of the arbitration panel is admissible as evidence only in medical malpractice
cases, there is an unconstitutional discrimination against medical malpractice defendants.
137. When deciding whether a party is discriminated against, the court must first determine
the class to which the party belongs. Discrimination is then decided within this class. It appears
that the most appropriate class here is that of all participants in medical malpractice actions.
138. Legislative enactments are presumed valid, unless shown to be arbitrary and unreason-
able. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
139. Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
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reasonable and appropriate condition to the bringing of a lawsuit of a
specified kind or class . "... ,,40 The court found that "the basis of distinction
[was] real" and held that "the condition imposed [pretrial panels in medical
malpractice actions] has a reasonable relation to a legitimate object."' 4 '
Amelioration of the medical malpractice insurance crisis may therefore be a
legitimate public policy objective, and establishment of malpractice panels to
deal with the insurance crisis caused by the rise in such suits would not result
in a denial of equal protection.
C. Due Process
In most mediation panel cases the claim of denial of substantive due process
is identical to the claim of denial of equal protection and is based upon the
inequality of plaintiff and defendant in the action. 42 Substantive due process
ensures that the legislature exercises its police power in a nonarbitrary manner
and that the laws it passes bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
object.143 To satisfy substantive due process, the exercise of a state's police
power demands the same justification as does the denial of equal protec-
tion.144 Procedural due process, on the other hand, involves those rights
which are "so fundamental to the protection of justice and liberty that 'due
process of law' cannot be accorded without it. ' '14S- What is due process of law
depends on the circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation. The issue here is whether the states must guaran-
tee a trial de novo to a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action or whether
states may limit him to a panel or arbitration hearing, subject only to an
appeal.
As noted earlier, 46 there is a basic distinction between panels and arbitra-
tion. While panels attempt to discourage frivolous claims and encourage the
settlement of meritorious ones, 147 arbitration attempts to settle all claims by
totally replacing the trial process. As a result, arbitration systems more often
involve a due process question. Although such systems are not as common as
mediation panels in the medical malpractice area, they do exist in a number of
states on either a voluntary or mandatory basis. In the case of voluntary
140. Id. at 558.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Solomon v. Memorial Hosp., 43 Fla. Supp. 105, 106 (Cir. Ct. 1975;
Sparkman v. Carter, 43 Fla. Supp. 107, 108-09 (Cir. Ct. 1975), revd, 33S So 2d 802 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
143. See note 144 infra.
144. A denial of substantive due process must be justified by a rational basis in the
circumstances under discussion. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); see B. Schwartz,
Constitutional Law § 100, at 165-66, § 153, at 288 (1972).
145. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 212 (1968).
146. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
147. Since panels usually never replace litigation, there is no need to question the right to a
trial de novo in that context.
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arbitration, since the parties have consented to arbitration, there is no
question of due process.' 14  However, when compulsory arbitration (and
compulsory panels, if limited appeal provisions common to arbitration are
included) is involved,1 49 the demands of due process become more difficult to
fulfill.
Compulsory, final, and binding arbitration, without more, violates due
process because it eliminates an individual's right to a judicial hearing. ISO In
this respect, mere appellate review, on the grounds normally invoked to
overturn an arbitrator's award,' 5 ' may be sufficient. Since a judicial hearing
would be provided by an appeal, due process would appear to be satisfied.
Thus, in a case involving compulsory arbitration of a labor dispute, the New
York Court of Appeals in Mount St. Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood 12 held
that only limited judicial review of an arbitration decision is necessary. 153 In
determining the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration under the Labor
Law, 5 4 the court stated: "There is no doubt that the legislature may establish
a tribunal other than a court, to hear and determine disputes even where
substantial property rights are involved, but there must be due process of law,
both substantive and procedural."15 5 There must be a review of both the legal
and factual basis for the arbitrator's decision in order to satisfy due process. 156
As long as a limited appeal is permitted, to allow a reviewing court to
determine whether there is a reasonable basis to support the award, due
process is satisfied.
More clearly relevant to the medical malpractice area is the New York pilot
program of compulsory arbitration of small claims. ' 5 7 Recent decisions in that
area are apposite here because of New York's proposed bill providing for
limited review of arbitration awards for all medical malpractice claims under
$25,000.118 In Bayer v. Ras,' 9 a lower court held that a trial de novo after
compulsory arbitration was guaranteed by the constitutional requirements of
148. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 355, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (1976);
see note 25 supra.
149. Although the question of limited appeal will be discussed in the context of arbitration,
where it more often arises, the same analysis holds true for a panel from which only appellate
review is permitted.
150. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289 (1924); Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 542-44 (1922).
151. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 75 11(b) (McKinney 1963). The usual grounds for the reversal of
arbitration awards enumerated by the statute are fraud, prejudice, abuse of power by the
arbitrator, and noncompliance with the applicable statutory provisions.
152. 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970).
153. Id. at 506, 260 N.E.2d at 515, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
154. N.Y. Lab. Law § 716 (McKinney 1977). This section governs employment agreements
at hospitals. Medical care, the subject of malpractice suits, is not covered by the statute.
155. 26 N.Y.2d at 505, 260 N.E.2d at 514, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
156. Id. at 507-08, 260 N.E.2d at 515-16, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 873-74.
157. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.2 (Jud. Conf. 1973).
158. N.Y.S. 977, 1975-76 Reg. Sess., § 1 (1975).
159. 71 Misc. 2d 464, 336 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
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due process as well as by the statute. This holding is in accord with the
leading Pennsylvania case of In re Smith,'160 in which a compulsory arbitra-
tion plan for small claims was held constitutional as long as it preserved the
right to a trial de novo.
Also analogous to the medical malpractice area is the automobile no-fault
insurance law. In Grace v. Howlett,' 6' the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the right to trial was violated by that state's no-fault law, which denied both a
trial de novo and an appeal of mandatory arbitration decisions in all cases
involving claims less than $3,000 in Illinois. Its decision was based in part on
the fact that the circuit court, to which the appeal had been allowed, was
essentially a court of original jurisdiction, 62 and therefore due process could
only be preserved in that court by providing a trial de novo.16 3
The standard procedure for determining workmen's compensation cases, on
the other hand, is that of a panel substituted entirely for a trial. 164 By reason
of the countervailing sacrifices demanded of both parties (the employer's strict
liability weighed against the exclusivity of the workman's remedy), the courts
have generally held this procedure not to be a violation of due process.' 16
Also, because this procedure is deemed similar to a voluntary agreement to
arbitrate, it is distinguishable from compulsory arbitration.
It is submitted that in the malpractice area, when there is compulsory
arbitration, the right to a full trial is guaranteed: an appeal subsequent to
arbitration is insufficient. The Court of Appeals of New York, in holding that
only an appeal was necessary to satisfy due process for compulsory arbitration
under the Labor Law, 166 reasoned that voluntary and compulsory arbitration
presented the same question. According to the court, the only additional
review required on appeal of compulsory arbitration awards is one to examine
if there is reasonable evidence to support the award. It should be emphasized,
however, that Catherwood involved the labor field where arbitration provi-
sions are now common and well established. In the malpractice litigation
area, as in the small claims and no-fault areas, arbitration is a very recent
development and one which should not totally replace the right to a full trial
subsequent to a panel hearing. It therefore appears that the most reasonable
approach is not the Catherwood approach, for voluntary arbitration is not
equivalent to compulsory arbitration. However, where voluntarily agreed
upon, arbitration may replace the litigation process and appellate review will
be sufficient to satisfy due process. But when compliance with either arbitra-
tion or a mediation panel is compulsory, a complete rehearing in a trial de
160. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nor. Smith v. Weisler, 350 U.S. 858
(1955).
161. 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
162. Id. at 490-91, 283 N.E.2d at 480-81. The Illinois constitution provides for appeal of
administrative decisions to the circuit courts. Ill. Const. art. 6, § 9.
163. 51 Ill. 2d at 490, 283 N.E.2d at 480.
164. E.g., N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 140 (McKinney 1965).
165. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
166. See notes 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
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novo may be necessary to satisfy the guarantee of the parties' right of due
process. 167
D. Judicial Function
Nearly every statute providing for a mediation panel or arbitration requires
at least one judge or attorney to be a member of the panel' 68 in addition to
some medical member or members. The panel hears cases in a manner
analogous to that of a trial; the panel's function therefore closely resembles a
judicial function. On the other hand, most states provide in their constitution
that judges are to devote full time to their judicial duties, 169 and that only
judges are to perform judicial functions.170 The first issue is whether the
panel performs a judicial function, and, if it does, whether nonjudicial officers
are impermissibly performing judicial ftinctions. Secondly, if the panel per-
forms a nonjudicial function, there is the contrary problem of whether judges
are performing nonjudicial functions, and therefore not devoting full time to
their judicial duties.
The initial issue to resolve is whether the panel performs a judicial
function. However, in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association, '171 the
Illinois Supreme Court ignored this issue. In Illinois, panels are employed only
after a complaint has been filed.1 72 The court noted that, at this stage in the
litigation, and despite the fact that the case is under the panel's jurisdiction,
the case appears to fall in the judicial domain. 173 In stating that judges were
not devoting full time to their judicial functions because they participated in
such panels, 174 the court appeared to hold that panels were nonjudicial
functions. At the same time, however, it held that the findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by the physician and attorney on the panel, over the
dissent of the judge, were an exercise of a judicial function by nonjudicial
officers and therefore impermissible under the Illinois constitution, which
vests original jurisdiction in the courts. 17 Inasmuch as the physician and
attorney were found to be performing a judicial function and the judge, by
the same conduct, was not, the holding is highly confusing and contradictory.
It would seem that the proper approach to the resolution of the issue is to
question first whether the panel itself is performing a judicial function.
167. The question of the admissibility of the panel's findings into evidence should be treated
as a question of the infringement of the jury trial right, not due process. See part III(A) supra.
168. See appendix II. Only Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska provide that the
attorney be merely an advisor and have no vote. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-9.5-9-3 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1976); Kan. Stat. § 65-4901 (Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.47(c) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977); ch. 434, § 41(1), 1976 Neb. Laws 166.
169. E.g., Fla. Const. art. 5, § 18; Ill. Const. art. 0, § 13.
170. E.g., I11. Const. art. 6, §§ 1, 9.
171. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
172. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 58.3 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977).
173. 63 Ill. 2d at 321-22, 347 N.E.2d at 739.
174. Id. at 322-23, 347 N.E.2d at 739-40. For a more technical discussion of "judicial
function," see John Marshall, supra note 1, at 140-42.
175. Il. Const. art. 6, § 1.
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Because the Illinois court failed to ask the important initial question, it is
unclear from its opinion whether or not the panel does perform a judicial
function and what panel composition would therefore be permissible.
Further support for the position that panels fall into the judicial domain is
evident in the only other cases to consider this issue. A lower Florida court
found that the judge's participation as referee on a panel, application to which
was a mandatory prerequisite to the filing of a complaint, 76 was not the
exercise of a judicial function. 77 The lower court further held that the statute
providing for the panel was unconstitutional, among other reasons, on this
basis. The Supreme Court of Florida, reversing, did not address the issue.
Perhaps the most logical position on this issue, and one urged by the appellant
in that case, is that a judge as "judicial referee" is necessarily performing a
judicial function. 7 8 This view presupposes that the panel performs a judicial
function. The failure of the supreme court to address this question, while, at
the same time, holding the statute constitutional, can be construed as acquies-
cence in the appellant's reasoning (i.e., the panel performs a judicial func-
tion). 17 9 It would seem reasonable to conclude that a mediation panel,
although instituted prior to the filing of a complaint but as a mandatory
prerequisite to such filing, would serve some type of judicial function. Since
the panel is so closely tied to the litigation of the claim, is required before
litigation may proceed, and follows rules of law, it would be at least a
quasi-judicial proceeding.
Assuming, then, that all panels perform judicial functions, it necessarily
follows that a judge on a panel performs a judicial duty.8 0 This result
resolves the constitutional issue of judges devoting full time to their judicial
duties.
The question of nonjudicial members performing judicial functions is more
difficult to resolve. If no judge is a member of the panel, the operation of the
panel involves the appearance of impropriety. However, the presence of a
judge on the panel does not itself eliminate the appearance of impropriety.
For example, in Wright, which involved a panel composed of a judge, an
attorney, and a physician, the physician's and attorney's opinion prevailed
over the judge's dissent. '8 ' Although the reasoning in Wright led to contradic-
tory results, the fact that the opinion of the panel was opposite to that of the
judge is striking 8 2 and may have been a contributing factor to the court's
distrust of that state's panel system.
176. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.133(I)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
177. Solomon v. Memorial Hosp., 43 Fla. Supp. 10S, 107 (Cir. Ct. 1975); Sparkman v.
Carter, 43 Fla. Supp. 107, 109 (Cir. Ct. 1975), rev'd, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977).
178. Brief for Appellant, Sparkman v. Carter, 43 Fla. Supp. at 124.
179. In fact, a concurring opinion did adopt this conclusion. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d
802, 807-08 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
180. This consideration is inapplicable if there is no judge on the panel.




In the event that the use of nonjudicial members on these panels is
considered impermissible, possible justifications must be considered. Having a
medical member on panels may be justified by the need for expert opinion in
order to adequately interpret the medical facts. The use of laymen on the
panel may be justified by analogy to the use of laymen on juries regularly
employed to decide such cases.18 3 Attorneys on the panel provide knowledge
of the law and, when there is no judge Onl the panel, decide motions as
judicial referees.' 8 4 These justifications find some support in the common
practice in federal' 8 5 (and some state) 8 6 courts of using masters or referees to
hear all or certain portions of cases and make findings of fact and conclusions
of law.' 8 7 Most often the masters are attorneys, but special masters with
expertise in the area involved may be appointed. 8 8 Although state rules of
procedure are often not as liberal as the federal rules, which would by analogy
validate panels with attorney or physician members, the same reasoning could
be used to argue the validity of the use of attorneys and physicians on medical
malpractice panels in state courts. However, while attorneys and medical
members would be allowed to serve because of their expertise, this justifica-
tion cannot be used to support the presence of laymen on panels.189 There is
an additional practical justification for having nonjudicial members on the
panel. If no one except judges could be panelists, each panel would simply
serve as a pretrial conference' 9" and would have little additional utility. In
sum, while the composition of the panels can be changed to meet specific state
requirements, the reasonableness and necessity of including nonjudicial mem-
bers on mediation panels in complex medical malpractice actions is ample
justification for such members performing judicial functions.
IV. MODEL PLAN
Medical malpractice mediation varies extensively among the states. While
the more informal-and less effective-systems present few constitutional
problems, others are quite strict and involve grave constitutional difficulties.
A model plan in conformity with the constitutional considerations outlined
above is offered to present some guidance as to what provisions may or should
be included by a state in its panel system in order to produce the most
effective and constitutionally acceptable prelitigation panel possible. In doing
183. Indeed, Idaho refers to its panel as in the nature of a special civil grand jury. Idaho
Code § 6-1001 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
184. See, e.g., Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A05(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 40, § 1301.308(b) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977).
185. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
186. E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 4317-4320 (McKinney 1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§
2101.06-.07 (Page 1976).
187. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(c).
188. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a). See also 5A Moore's Federal Practice 53,03, at 2921-22 (2d cd.
1975).
189. But see note 183 supra and accompanying text
190. See Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1976), (England, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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so, it is assumed that the basic jury trial system, which has worked well in
tort litigation, should be preserved.
First, the mediation system should be of the panel type.' 9 ' A panel provides
for a quick hearing of the claim, allows settlement if the parties are so
disposed, and leads to a more efficient trial, if settlement should prove
impossible. 192 Arbitration, on the other hand, works to a binding solution and
is based on compromise.' 93 As a result, arbitration should be only an
alternative, limited to those situations where there is voluntary agreement
between the parties. 19 4
Second, the panel should be mandatory for the simple reason that voluntary
panels have been relatively unsuccessful.19 s As discussed above, mandatory
panels would not appear to infringe upon the right to trial by jury.196 Neither
would the right to due process appear to be violated, provided that a trial de
novo, and not merely appellate review, is guaranteed. 197 In addition, manda-
tory panels force all claims through the same procedures, resulting in lower
litigation costs and, therefore, lower insurance rates.1 98
Third, the decision of the panel must be admissible in evidence at a
subsequent trial. Without this provision, the panel is ineffective; parties will
not have to prepare their cases and will not feel compelled to comply with
panel requests. The admissibility of the panel's decision forces all parties to
prepare fully, and, therefore, may account for the fact that there have initially
been few settlements.' 9 9 If trial results were consistent with panel results,
however, this pattern should change.2 0 0 Furthermore, it appears that allow-
ing the decision of the panel into evidence does not violate the right to trial by
jury because it does not usurp the jury's power to render a final decision. 2 0,
The decision of the panel should be considered as some evidence on the issue
of liability, but should not carry any inference or presumption of liability. 202
191. There is a split of opinion among commentators as to the best format. See generally
Baker, Proposal for a Medical Malpractice Arbitration Plan Using Cleveland, Ohio as a Model,
1972 Ins. L.J. 625, 627-28 (Arbitration has the best chance of acceptance by all.); Florida, supra
note 12, at 77 (A screening panel is the best alternative.); Note, Ohio's Rx for the Medical
Malpractice Crisis: The Patient Pays, 45 U. Cin. L. Rev. 90, 101 (1976) (Arbitration has the
widest support.).
192. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. The American Bar Association agrees and so recommends. See note 23 supra.
195. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
196. See part IIMA)(1) supra.
197. See part 1I(C) supra.
198. There is always the possibility of increased costs since the panel may or may not be used
in addition to the trial. However, this should be offset by a greater number of settlements.
199. Special Advisory Panel, supra note 8, at 27, 48, 210. Where a party is as fully prepared
as he would be for trial, he might be reluctant to accept an adverse settlement suggested by a
panel, because a trial will cost little more in terms of time and preparation.
200. It is unlikely that a party would incur the extra expense of a trial if it were fairly certain
that the result would be the same.
201. See part II(A)(2) supra.
202. Contra, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A06(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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Such weight should be given to the decision as the jury chooses to ascribe to
it, based upon the reasoning of the decision and all other evidence. As a
safeguard against prejudice and confusion, however, the decision should be
subject to review by the trial judge before being read to the jury,20 3 as is the
procedure for masters' reports. 20 4 Unanimity should not- be required for
admissibility, but the vote of the panelists should be made known to the jury,
so that they may weigh each member's decision and give it whatever weight
they choose. At trial, the parties should be allowed to call panelists as
witnesses (with the possible exception of a judge who was a member of the
panel),20 5 to question them concerning the decision of the panel and any
particular area of their expertise. This would further minimize the effect of
the panel's decision on the jury and would provide at least one expert already
familiar with the facts of the case.
Fourth, the jurisdiction of the panel should cover either all medical
malpractice actions or an unlimited category of health care providers. In this
way, most equal protection challenges could be avoided. 20 6 The panels,
however, must be utilized only after a complaint has been filed so that a judge
will determine whether a panel is appropriate or necessary. If the case is so
minor that the cost of a panel would be an undue burden, the panel procedure
should not be made available. In addition, cases which may be disposed of by
motion to dismiss or by motion for summary judgment will obviate the need
for a panel. If a panel is subject to a judge's order, it is in effect discretionary,
a procedure which would permit a desired flexibility.
Fifth, the panel should be composed of a judge, an attorney, and at least
one member of the medical profession. 20 7 Such a membership would provide
a respectable, intelligent, and unbiased panel. Since the panel is activated
after the complaint is filed and the parties are within the judicial domain, it is
reasonably certain that the panel would perform a judicial function. 20 8 The
use of nonjudicial members, on the other hand, is desirable for an effective
panel and is justifiable for a number of reasons, including the practice of
using masters and special referees in other types of pretrial proceedings. 20 9
Other provisions which are included in the statutes of some states might
add to the effectiveness of the panel. The panel's jurisdiction might be limited
in time to six to nine months. 21 0 This would provide a reasonable time for
discovery and preparation while helping to dispose of medical malpractice
actions promptly. The mandatory hearing could itself be informal, but the
decision of the panel should follow the law and be supported by adequate
203. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text
204. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3).
205. There is the possibility of an appearance of impropriety in requiring judges to testify.
206. See part III(B) supra.
207. If possible, at least one medical member of the panel should be a specialist; otherwise,
there should be a specialist as an additional panelist or consultant.
208. See part I1(D) supra.
209. See notes 185-89 supra and accompanying text.
210. E.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 16-9.5-9-3.5 (Bums Curi. Supp. 1976).
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reasoning. 211 This procedure would allow the jury to question the basis of the
panel's decision and, at the same time, inform the parties of their status so as
to encourage an equitable settlement.
Other rules may be deemed necessary by a particular state, perhaps to
satisfy a particular interest group. 2 12 However, the guidelines set forth above
provide a basic procedure for screening medical malpractice claims that is
both effective and constitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
The medical malpractice screening panel can be an effective tool in
controlling the increasing litigation in the malpractice field. The constitutional
guarantees of right to trial by jury, equal protection, due process, and proper
exercise of judicial function must, however, be preserved. 2 3 If the panels are
intended merely to screen cases and to shorten the litigation process, they
should be constitutionally acceptable. If decisions on the issue of liability and
determinations of damages are admissible into evidence at trial and if the trial
judge can exercise his discretion in overseeing this process, panels will be
successful. Arbitration, the principal alternative to mediation panels and to
litigation itself, appears constitutionally acceptable only where it is volun-
tary.2 14 It must be recognized, however, that a completely voluntary ap-
proach cannot solve the growth in medical malpractice litigation. 2t 5 There-
fore, it is submitted that the best long-range constitutional solution to the
current medical malpractice insurance crisis would be a mandatory medical
malpractice screening panel similar to the proposed model panel.
Edward F. Seavers, Jr.
211. E.g., N.M. StaL Ann. §§ 58-33-19(c), -20(c) (Interim Supp. 1976), But see Abrams v.
Brooklyn Hosp., - isc. 2d -, -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (reasoning not
required).
212. Thus, in New York, plaintiff's attorneys demanded representation on the panel. Martin.
Critique of the Report of the Commission on Medical Malpractice, in 1973 National Medicolegal
Symposium 85, 86.
213. These constitutional rights must be preserved by the statutes or construed as such by the
courts, as in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied. 429 U5.S 1041 (1977)-
214. See notes 74-77, 146-67 supra and accompanying text.
215. See notes 10, 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
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STATE PANEL HYBRID TRATION PLAINT PLAINT ACTION ACTION









KAN. X Xa X
















VA. X (alt) X X
WIS. X (alt) X X
a - discretionary with the judge





PANEL MEMBERS AND JURISDICTION
STATE JUDGE ATTY. PHYS. "HCP"- LAYMAN JURISDICTION
ALAS. 3 experts health care providers
ARIZ. X X X (X) medical malpractice claim
ARK. X X X physicians, dentists, chiropractors
DEL. X X X 2 health care providers
FLA. X X X physicians, hospitals & med. facility
HAW. Xe X X health care providers
IDAHO X X (+X) X physicians, hospitals
ILL. X X X med., hosp. or healing art malpractice
IND. Xa (1) (2) health care providers
KAN. Xa 3 health care providers
LA. Xa 3 (3) health care providers
MD.c  Xb X X over S5,0O0; health care providers
MASS. X X X (X) health care providers
MO. Xa 'b 2 2 X health care providers
NEB. X3 3 health care providers
NEV. 3 3 physicians and associates
N.H. X (X) (X) (X) X attorneys, physicians, dentists
N.J. X 2 2 physicians
N.M. X 3 health care providers
N.Y. X X X medical malpractice claim
OHIO 3 arbitrators physicians, hospitals
PA. 12b  2 3 health care providers
R.I. master X X physicians
S.D. X X f  present and future (under $10,000)
2 2f  medical services (over $10,000)
TENN.d X X 2 (2) 2 health care providers
VT. X X (X) X medical malpractice claim
VA. Xa 3 3 health care providers
WIS. X 2 (1) 2 health care providers (over $10,000)
Xb X X health care providers (under $10,000)
if defendant is of this category, a person of this class replaces physician
(+) = if defendant is of this category, additional panelist
a = no vote
b = decides motions
c = may agree on one person in lieu of panel
d = statute calls for 7 on panel, but list adds to 6
e = chairperson, not necessarily judge
f = these pick one more panelist
g = "HCP" means health care provider and includes such miscellaneous panel members as
dentists and hospital administrators.
352 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
APPENDIX III
DECISION AND EFFECT ON TRIAL
BURDEN CALL PANELIST
STATE TO CONTINUE DECISION ADMISSIBLE AS WITNESS
ALAS. None' Yes Yes
4
ARIZ. Plaintiff Yes No
ARK. Plaintiff No No
DEL. Court' Yes No
FLA. Plaintiff Yes No
HAW. Plaintiff No No
IDAHO Plaintiff No No
ILL. Plaintiff2  No No
IND. Plaintiff Yes Yes
KAN. Plaintiff No Yess
LA. Plaintiff Yes Yes
MD. Rejecting party Yes No
MASS. Plaintiff Yes No
MO. Plaintiff No No
NEB. Plaintiff Yes Yes
NEV. Plaintiff No provision No
N.H. Plaintiff No No
N.J. Plaintiff No6  No
N.M. Plaintiff No No
N.Y. Court If unanimous Yes
4
OHIO Plaintiff Yes Yes
7
PA. Appealing party Yes No
R.I. Appealing party Yes No
S.D. Plaintiff No No
TENN. Plaintiff Yes No
VT. Appealing party3  Yes No
VA. Plaintiff Yes Yes
WIS.
formal Appealing party3  Yes No
informal Appealing party3  No No
1. Action pending in court appears to continue automatically unless settled.
2. If it is a unanimous adverse decision, loser must timely reject.
3. Either party may file for confirmation of judgment.
4. Panelist may testify regarding the decision to extent that its contents are admissible.
5. Only Kansas allows a party to call a member of the panel as a witness, but does not allow the
decision into evidence.
6. The decision is admissible with the consent of the parties.































Alaska §§ 09.55.535-.536 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-567 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-2601 to 2612 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Del. Code tit. 18, §§ 6802-6814 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 768.133-.134 (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
Ch. 219, §§ 2-11 to 20, 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws 523.
Idaho Code §§ 6-1001 to 1013 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 58.2-.10 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977).
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to 9-10 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1976).
Kan. Stat. §§ 65-4901 to 4908 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.47 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 3-2A01 to 2A09 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 60B (MichielLaw. Co-op Cum. Supp- 1977).
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 538.015-.080 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976).
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-2840 to 2847 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41A.010-.090 (1975).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 519-A:1 to A-10 (1974)
N.J. Civ. Prac. R. 4:21.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-33-1 to 33-28 (Interim Supp. 1976).
N.Y. Jud. Law § 148-a (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2711.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1977).
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §§ 1301.301-.309 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977)
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-19-1 to 19-10 (Supp. 1976).
S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 21-25B-1 to 2SB-26 (Supp. 1977).
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-3401 to 3421 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 7001-7008 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Va. Code §§ 8-911 to 922 (Cum. Supp. 1976).




MEDIATION PANEL AND ARBITRATION STATUTES
CITATION
